Optimal Corporate Governance in the Presence of an Activist Investor
We provide a model of governance in which a board arbitrates between an activist investor and a manager facing reputational concerns. The optimal level of internal board governance depends on both the severity of the agency conflict and the strength of external governance. Internal governance creates a certification effect, so greater intervention by the board can lead to worse managerial behavior. Internal and external governance are substitutes when external governance is weak (the board commits to an interventionist policy to induce participation from the activist) and complements when external governance is strong (the board relies to a greater extent on the activist's information). The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cohn, Jonathan B. ; Rajan, Uday |
Published in: |
Review of Financial Studies. - Society for Financial Studies - SFS. - Vol. 26.2013, 4, p. 985-1020
|
Publisher: |
Society for Financial Studies - SFS |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Optimal corporate governance in the presence of an activist investor
Cohn, Jonathan B., (2013)
-
Credit ratings : strategic issuer disclosure and optimal screening
Cohn, Jonathan B., (2013)
-
Optimal Corporate Governance in the Presence of an Activist Investor
Cohn, Jonathan B., (2013)
- More ...