Optimal Fines for Environmental Noncompliance Under a Decentralized Enforcement Policy
Year of publication: |
2001-02
|
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Authors: | Franckx, Laurent |
Institutions: | Centrum voor Economische Studiƫn, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen |
Subject: | decentralized environmental enforcement | optimal penalties |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | 34 pages |
Classification: | K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Q20 - Renewable Resources and Conservation; Environmental Management. General |
Source: |
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