Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns : Theory and Evidence
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Gibbons, Robert S. ; Murphy, Kevin J. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Karriereplanung | Career development |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (52 p) |
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Series: | NBER Working Paper ; No. w3792 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 1991 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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