Optimal monitoring schedule in dynamic contracts
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Chen, Mingliu ; Sun, Peng ; Xiao, Yongbo |
Published in: |
Operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0030-364X, ZDB-ID 123389-0. - Vol. 68.2020, 5, p. 1285-1314
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Subject: | dynamic contract | moral hazard | principal-agent model | optimal control | continuous time | costly state verification | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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