Optimal unemployment insurance : when search takes effort and money
Year of publication: |
October 2015
|
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Authors: | Schwartz, Jesse |
Published in: |
Labour economics : official journal of the European Association of Labour Economists. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0927-5371, ZDB-ID 1167233-X. - Vol. 36.2015, p. 1-17
|
Subject: | Unemployment insurance | Moral hazard | Hidden information | Unemployment | Search | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Moral Hazard | Arbeitsuche | Job search | Suchtheorie | Search theory |
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