Optimality and equilibrium for binary decision problems in a committee
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Laslier, Jean-François ; Weibull, Jörgen W. |
Publisher: |
Stockholm : Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |
Subject: | Abstimmung | Abstimmungsparadoxon | Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit | Entscheidungstheorie | voting | condorcet | committee | jury | judgement aggregation |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 557536758 [GVK] hdl:10419/56094 [Handle] |
Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
-
Commitee decisions: optimality and equilibrium
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Optimality and equilibrium for binary decision problems in a committee
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