Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Juarez, Ruben ; You, Jung S. |
Subject: | Single-peaked preferences | Strategy-proofness | Worst-case analysis | Efficiency | Uniform rule | Consistency | Divisible good | Economic surplus | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Allokation | Allocation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
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