Other-Regarding Principal and Moral Hazard

Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability we characterize the optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is ‘inequity averse’ vis-a-vis the self-regarding case. Also the agent is generally (weakly) better-off under an ‘inequity- averse’ principal compared to a ‘status seeking’ principal

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Banerjee, Swapnendu ; Sarkar, Mainak
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 10, 2013 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2294347 [DOI]
Classification:	D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014155605