Patent Quality and the 'Public Notice' Function of Patent Rights

A patent fails to deliver public notice when it informs little about the patent boundary decision of the court. High quality of patent examination, i.e, less mistakes committed by the patent office, improves public notice. This paper provides a framework of evaluating the benefit of public notice to facilitate private investments, and how this information value is affected by strategic investments, market structure, and the accumulation of patent rights

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Year of publication:	[2014]
Authors:	Chiou, Jing-Yuan
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Patent \| Patentrecht \| Patent law

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (31 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 1, 2012 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1375363 [DOI]
Classification:	K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior. General ; O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes ; O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012708360