Pay-for-Performance Tests Will Change the US Game

Based on current say-on-pay voting patterns and empirical evidence for pay-for-performance in the largest 100 US companies, this paper argues that public and shareholder scrutiny of executive compensation will further increase. The result will be much more shareholder rejections of executive compensation proposals as seen in the past

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Stern, Hermann J.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (5 p)
Series:	Executive Compensation Briefing ; Vol. 8, No. 9, April 2012
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2, 2012 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2070559 [DOI]
Classification:	G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; G31 - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy ; M12 - Personnel Management ; M10 - Business Administration. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040767