Payoff implications of incentive contracting
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Garrett, Daniel F. |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 16.2021, 4, p. 1281-1312
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Subject: | Asymmetric information | mechanism design | robustness | procurement | Asymmetrische Information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE4293 [DOI] hdl:10419/253531 [Handle] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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