Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining.
Year of publication: |
1993
|
---|---|
Authors: | Krishna, V. ; Serrano, R. |
Institutions: | Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER), Department of Economics |
Subject: | bargaining |
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