Perfect information games where each player acts only once
Kutay Cingiz, János Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Cingiz, Kutay ; Flesch, János ; Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques ; Predtetchinski, Arkadi |
| Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 69.2020, 4, p. 965-985
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| Subject: | Minority games | Subgame perfect €-equilibria | Upper semicontinuous functions | Infinitely many players | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vollkommene Information | Complete information |
| Description of contents: | Description [link.springer.com] |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Correction enthalten in: Volume 70, Number 3, October 2020, Seite 905 |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012240686