Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule
We analyze optimal appointments to a committee whose members play an admissibly coalition proof equilibrium. The nominator may appoint a candidate with the opposite preference ordering over the agenda, as the committee would then reach the nominator’s top ranked decision by divide and rule: the majority who prefer another decision are immobilised by internal divisions. Our results may explain why Disraeli extended the franchise to skilled male workers in 1867 against centrist opposition; and why an electorate whose preferences are not polarized may choose a polarized voting pattern.
Year of publication: |
2006-04
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Authors: | Seidmann, Daniel |
Institutions: | Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), School of Economics |
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