Political Costs and Strategic Corporate Communication

Do firms strategically use advertising campaigns when subject to the threat of political costs? Communication via advertising can assuage public concerns, which, in turn, reduces the pressure on elected officials to impose political costs on the industry. We identify expected political costs using cases of repeated industry testimony at congressional hearings. To disentangle strategic advertising in response to the threat of political costs from advertising for other reasons (e.g., reputation building or to generate sales), we exploit the fact that only politicians overseeing industry-relevant hearings can impose costs on a given industry. We find that subsequent to these hearings, affected industries increase their advertising by 132% more in the electorates of the politicians overseeing the hearings, relative to the increase in the electorates of other politicians. The effects are magnified in the electorates served by the most senior politicians on the committees, in election years, and when the hearings are longer or include a higher proportion of legislation-related words. Moreover, our results are not driven by politicians' decisions to serve on committees relevant to their local-area firms. In sum, our findings provide novel evidence about corporate communication with non-investor stakeholders