Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations

Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.

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Year of publication:	2013-04
Authors:	Weese, Eric
Institutions:	Economic Growth Center, Economics Department
Subject:	boundaries \| mergers \| moment inequalities \| municipalities

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The price is None 58 pages
Classification:	C63 - Computational Techniques ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010648169