Politicians and Firms.
The authors present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model. The authors use the model and several extensions to understand why commercialization and privatization might work and what forces contribute to effective restructuring of public enterprises. They illustrate the model using examples from several countries. Copyright 1994, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Shleifer, Andrei ; Vishny, Robert W |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 109.1994, 4, p. 995-1025
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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