Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy : An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government

1 Analyzing Government -- Two Approaches to Analyzing Government -- The Interest-Group Theory of Government -- Plan of the Study -- Notes -- 2 Questions to be Answered -- Wealth Transfers and Organization Costs -- The “Market” for Wealth Transfers -- What This Analysis Is Not About -- What This Analysis Is About -- Summary -- Appendix: Heterogeneity Begets Wealth Redistribution -- Notes -- 3 The Demand and Supply of Wealth Transfers -- Maximizing the Returns from Legislation in a Bicameral -- Vote Market -- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures -- Summary -- Notes -- 4 Legislatures as Wage Cartels -- Theory and Preliminary Implications -- A Test of Relative Wage Implications -- Wage Pay and Malfeasance -- Summary -- Notes -- 5 The Outside Earnings of Politicians -- The Market for Legislators -- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures -- Low Wage Pay as an Entry Barrier in Politics -- Summary -- Notes -- 6 The Supply of Majority Leadership -- Competition for Majority Leadership -- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures -- Summary -- Notes -- 7 The Determinants of Executive Branch Compensation -- Gubernatorial Compensation -- The Question of Malfeasance -- Summary -- Notes -- 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions -- Notes -- Name Index.