Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem
Year of publication: |
November 2016
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Authors: | Kawakami, Kei |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 45.2016, 4, p. 893-931
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Subject: | Information aggregation | Limited commitment | Posterior efficiency | Posterior implementation | Renegotiation-proofness | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination |
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