Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto

Following Mongin [12, 13], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 and incompatible with the Strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003-11
Authors:	Chambers, Christopher ; Hayashi, Takashi
Institutions:	California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Subject:	Harsanyi's Theorem \| preference aggregation \| subjective expected utility \| Savage's axioms

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published: published in Games and Economic Behavior 54(2006) pp. 430-440. Number 1184 11 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005654816