Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions
Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and (iii) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | List, John A. ; Shogren, Jason F. |
Published in: |
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. - Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA. - Vol. 81.1999, 4, p. 942-949
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Publisher: |
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA |
Saved in:
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