Providing Learning Incentives and the Use of a Multi-Purpose Performance Measure

This paper analyses the role of leading indicators that provide a firm manager with learning incentives of firm-specific skills. The effectiveness of leading indicators varies with contract scheme hired between the firm owner and the firm manager. I show that the leading indicator complements the outcome’s role of incentive provision at the sacrifice of information rent caused by the information asymmetry regarding manager’s learning capacity

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Mazda, Yasuhiro
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Performance-Messung \| Performance measurement \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Lernprozess \| Learning process

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 19, 2013 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2425448 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; M40 - Accounting and Auditing. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014146457