Public and Private Regulations for the Governance of the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates

The commercial development of offshore methane hydrates will necessitate planning for accidental risk. Due to the unique risks and hazards associated with the development of offshore methane hydrates, it is unlikely that their development would be capable of beginning without some form of ex ante risk governance mechanism such as civil liability or regulations. To attain efficient governance of those risks derived from the development of offshore methane hydrates, both public and private regulations should be considered as potential policy tools. This paper provides such a review, and finds that both public and private regulations can be employed as part of a broader strategy to efficiently govern the risks and hazards of offshore methane hydrates. Prior to the discussions on public and private regulation, the study provides an introduction to offshore methane hydrates. It attempts to summarize the potential commercial and welfare benefits that might be derived if offshore methane hydrates were to be developed. It also provides a survey of the potential cataclysmic and non-cataclysmic risks and hazards that would be presented if such developments were undertaken.A discussion is presented on the role of public and private regulations, how standards might set through the tool set of regulations. Second, the reasons for and advantages of public regulation to govern the risks of accidents are presented. Third, a discussion reviews the potential interactions of public regulation and private rules of civil liability. Fourth, the potential for private parties to advance private regulation to set standards and provide self-governance is examined. Finally, a discussion on the potential application of both public and private regulation to offshore methane hydrates is presented. A preliminary finding is presented that the circumstances of offshore methane hydrates would benefit from both public and private regulation.Next, specific recommendations are made as to the optimal balancing of public regulation and private regulation; an argument for the complementary implementation of public regulations alongside a rule of strict liability; an argument is also presented that private regulation could be additionally integrated alongside these two previous recommended mechanisms