Public Markets Tailored for the Cartel- Favoritism in Procurement Auctions
Year of publication: |
2006-05
|
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Authors: | Mogiliansky, Ariane Lambert ; Kosenok, Grigory |
Institutions: | Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), New Economic School (NES) |
Subject: | auction | collusion | favoritism | procurement |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number w0074 37 pages |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; H57 - Procurement |
Source: |
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