Randomized stopping games and Markov market games

We study nonzero-sum stopping games with randomized stopping strategies. The existence of Nash equilibrium and ɛ-equilibrium strategies are discussed under various assumptions on players random payoffs and utility functions dependent on the observed discrete time Markov process. Then we will present a model of a market game in which randomized stopping times are involved. The model is a mixture of a stochastic game and stopping game. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2007

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Ferenstein, Elżbieta
Published in:	Computational Statistics. - Springer. - Vol. 66.2007, 3, p. 531-544
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Stopping games \| Stochastic games \| Nash equilibrium \| Markov chain

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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