Relative Payoffs and Evolutionary Spite --- Evolutionary Equilibria in Games with Finitely Many Players
Year of publication: |
2003-08-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Clemens, Christiane ; Riechmann, Thomas |
Institutions: | Society for Computational Economics - SCE |
Subject: | Evolutionary Games | Evolutionary Equilibria | Spiteful Behavior | Relative Payoff |
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