Repeated Games with Partial Monitoring: the Stochastic Signaling Case
Year of publication: |
1996-05-14
|
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Authors: | Hillas, John ; Liu, Min |
Institutions: | EconWPA |
Subject: | repeated games | partial monitoring | nonstandard signaling |
Extent: | application/pdf application/postscript |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Type of Document - AMSLaTeX2e; prepared on IBM PC - emTeX; to print on PostScript; pages: 1 + 15 ; figures: included 1 pages |
Classification: | C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty |
Source: |
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