Repricing of executive stock options
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Yang, Jerry T. ; Carleton, Willard T. |
Published in: |
Review of quantitative finance and accounting. - New York, NY : Springer, ISSN 0924-865X, ZDB-ID 1087855-5. - Vol. 36.2011, 3, p. 459-490
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Subject: | Repricing | Executive stock options | Incentive contracts | Variable accounting charges | Agency costs | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Optionspreistheorie | Option pricing theory |
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