Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents.
Imagine that one player, the "incumbent," competes with several "entrants." Each entrant competes only with the incumbent, but obs erves play in all contests. Previous work shows that as more and more entrants are added, the incumbent's reputation may dominate play of the game, if the entrants are faced in sequence. The authors identify conditions under which similar results obtain when the entrants are faced simultaneously, and they find specifications in which adding mo re simultaneous entrants has a dramatically different effect. They al so show that incumbents need not prefer the situation in which their reputations dominate play to the "informationally isolated" case. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Year of publication: |
1987
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Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Kreps, David M |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 54.1987, 4, p. 541-68
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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