Revenue Non-Equivalence of Auctions with Budget- Constrained Buyers.
Year of publication: |
1993
|
---|---|
Authors: | Che, Y.K. ; Gale, I. |
Institutions: | Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems |
Subject: | auctions | bargaining | prices |
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