Risk Aversion in a Dynamic Trading Game
The effect of risk aversion on Nash equilibrium trade restrictions is studied using numerical methods. An increase in a nation's level of risk aversion can lead to either an increase or decrease in its equilibrium restriction and either an increase or decrease in its rival's restriction. The linear quadratic dynamic game is generalized to include risk aversion.
Year of publication: |
1986
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Authors: | Karp, Larry S. |
Institutions: | International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium - IATRC |
Keywords: | International Relations/Trade |
Saved in:
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