Robust Mechanism Design
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on richer type spaces. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Morris, Stephen |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 73.2005, 6, p. 1771-1813
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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