Satisficing Leads to Cooperation in Mutual Interests Games
We study the play of mutual interests games by satisficing decision makers. We show that, for a high enough inital aspiration level, and under certain assumptions of "tremble," there is a high probability (close to unity) of convergence to the Pareto dominant cooperative outcome. Simulations indicate that the theoretical result is robust with respect to the "trembling" mechanism.
Year of publication: |
1995-05
|
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Authors: | Pazgal, Amit |
Institutions: | Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management |
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