Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money
This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.
Year of publication: |
2007-10
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fujinaka, Yuji ; Wakayama, Takuma |
Institutions: | Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets
Fujinaka, Yuji, (2008)
-
A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Fair Division
Fujinaka, Yuji, (2008)
-
Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments
Mizukami, Hideki, (2006)
- More ...