Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Fujinaka, Yuji ; Wakayama, Takuma
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 699
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2007 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1021648 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223471