Seigniorage and Political Instability.
The importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. This paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform. The model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and, thus, will rely more heavily on seigniorage. This prediction of the model is tested on cross-sectional data for seventy countries. The authors find that, after controlling for other variables, political instability is positively associated with seigniorage. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Cukierman, Alex ; Edwards, Sebastian ; Tabellini, Guido |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 82.1992, 3, p. 537-55
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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