Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in the context of global pollution problems
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Heuson, Clemens |
Institutions: | Department Ökonomie, Helmholtz Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ) |
Subject: | strategic delegation | global pollution problems | self-protection | non-cooperative behaviour |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | UFZ Discussion Papers. - ISSN 1436-140X. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 18/2013 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H41 - Public Goods ; Q58 - Government Policy |
Source: |
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Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in the context of global pollution problems
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