Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities

The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006-02
Authors:	Kóczy, László Á.
Institutions:	Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem
Subject:	Core \| externalities \| sequential coalition formation \| order-independent equilibria

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior Number 0801 12 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764538