Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques ; Predtetchinski, Arkadi |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 95.2021, p. 1-15
|
Subject: | Coalition formation | Collective choice | Stationary equilibrium | Subgame perfect equilibrium | Voting | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Koalition | Coalition | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
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