Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems

We study a two-player one-arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop experimenting is irreversible, and players observe each other's actions but not each other's payoffs. We prove that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies and provide several qualitative results on the sequence of cutoffs. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Rosenberg, Dinah ; Solan, Eilon ; Vieille, Nicolas
Published in:	Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 75.2007, 6, p. 1591-1611
Publisher:	Econometric Society

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231847