Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Bhattacharya, Sourav ; Mukherjee, Arijit |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 44.2013, 3, p. 522-544
|
Subject: | persuasion game | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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