Strategic Play Among Family Members When Making Long-Term Care Decisions

This paper describes a strategic model of bargaining within a family to determine how to care for an elderly parent. We estimate the parameters of the model using data from the National Long-Term Care Survey. We find that the parameter estimates generally make sense and that the model is consistent with the data. The results have strong implications for using less structural empirical models for policy analysis.

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Year of publication:	1999-01
Authors:	Stern, Steven ; Hiedemann, Bridget
Institutions:	University of Virginia, Department of Economics
Subject:	Long-Term Care \| Family Bargaining \| Structural Estimation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Virginia Economics Online Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	41 pages
Classification:	C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; J14 - Economics of the Elderly
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005802000