Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership

Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations in the two localisations. It is shown that the distortions in the MNE's real investment portfolio are determined by a trade-off between fiscal externalities and equity externalities.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Olsen, T.E. ; Osmundsen, P.
Institutions:	Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH)
Subject:	TAXATION \| COMPETITION

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Series:	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	47 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646744