Strategic Taxation on Mobile Capital with Spillover Externality

By incorporating spillover externality into the model, a generalization of the strategic tax competition model is attempted to find the equilibrium tax rates chosen by both capital import and export jurisdictions. The result shows that jurisdictions not only choose their capital tax rates to manipulate the terms of trade, but also adjust them to control capital allocation among the jurisdictions to receive appropriate benefit spillovers.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Ogawa, Hikaru
Published in:	FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis. - ISSN 0015-2218. - Vol. 63.2007, 1, p. 33-45
Subject:	tax competition \| spillover \| fiscal externality \| pecuniary externality

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	H4 - Publicly Provided Goods ; H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations ; R5 - Regional Government Analysis
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764452