Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ehlers, Lars |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 14095506. - Vol. 7.2002, 1, p. 105
|
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A mechanism design approach
Andersson, Tommy, (2015)
-
Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Ehlers, Lars, (2014)
-
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden : Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings*
Andersson, Tommy, (2019)
- More ...