Striking Features of the Labor Market

The present paper develops a simple asymmetrical informational model that allows us to understand the individual´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor and enforce hours and offer different workweeks to the two types of workers a previous part-time/full-time wage schedules separating equilibrium was presented. In the other, only one work-week schedule can be offered.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2002-08-08
Authors:	Greene, William H. ; Martins, Ana P.
Institutions:	Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)
Subject:	Strikes \| asymmetric information \| signaling \| labor contracts \| part-time work \| mean or grouped data and limited dependent variables \| binary choice models with mean or grouped data \| sample selection with mean data

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	EERI Research Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number EERI RP 2002/08
Classification:	J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C24 - Truncated and Censored Models ; C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010721204