Strongly Coalition-Proof Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities
We identify two sufficient conditions for games with strategic complementarities to have a unique equilibrium that is "strongly coalition-proof," that is, immune to incentive-compatible deviations by coalitions. If a Nash equilibrium is unique, then it is strongly coalition-proof. Also, if each player's payoff is increasing (respectively, decreasing) in the other players' strategies, then the maximum (respectively, minimal) equilibrium is the unique strongly coalition-proof equilibrium. We offer several applications of these results, including one to the contracting model of Hart and Moore.
Authors: | Milgrom, Paul ; Roberts, John |
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Institutions: | Department of Economics, Stanford University |
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