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Subsidization to induce tipping

In binary choice games with strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria, we characterize the minimal cost subsidy program to guarantee agents play the Pareto optimal equilibrium. These subsidies are generally asymmetric, whether or not agents are identical and even if private values are anonymous.
Year of publication:
2011
Authors: Shafran, Aric P. ; Lepore, Jason J.
Published in:
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 110.2011, 1, p. 32-35
Publisher: Elsevier
Subject: Coordination failure Strategic complementarities Tipping
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Type of publication: Article
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008867056
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