Termination as an incentive device
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Grochulski, Borys ; Zhang, Yuzhe |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 18.2023, 1, p. 381-419
|
Subject: | dynamic moral hazard | Incentives | slow reflection | suspension | termination | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Anreiz | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
-
Present or future incentives? : on the optimality of fixed wages with moral hazard
Macera, Rosario, (2018)
-
Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality based approach
Arie, Guy, (2011)
-
A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives
Pagès, Henri, (2014)
- More ...
-
Termination as an incentive device
Grochulski, Borys, (2023)
-
Optimal liquidity regulation with shadow banking
Grochulski, Borys, (2016)
-
Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
Grochulski, Borys, (2011)
- More ...