The board of directors and firm performance : empirical evidence from listed companies
Purpose: This study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice. Design/methodology/approach: This research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership. Findings: While directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance. Research limitations/implications: This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance. Practical implications: This paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company. Originality/value: The results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Merendino, Alessandro ; Melville, Rob |
Published in: |
Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society. - Emerald, ISSN 1472-0701, ZDB-ID 2108826-3. - Vol. 19.2019, 3 (03.06.), p. 508-551
|
Publisher: |
Emerald |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Re-engineering audit : quality, control self assessment and the balanced scorecard
Melville, Rob, (1996)
-
A study on internal auditor perceptions of the function ability to add value
D'Onza, Giuseppe, (2015)
-
Books Reviewed - Crisis, Recovery, and the Role of Accounting Firms in the Pacific Basin
McKee, David L., (2003)
- More ...